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Subjective Income and Employment Expectations
and Preferences for Redistribution
Introduction
Recent theoretical models of redistributive politics assign a central role to expectations of upward and downward mobility as a determinant of individual attitudes toward redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001 ). The "prospect of upward mobility" (POUM) hypothesis is a particular case in point: not all currently poor people will support a policy that disproportionately taxes upper incomes because they may expect to move up in the income scale and therefore be hurt by such a policy. Similarly, not all currently rich people will be averse towards heavier taxation at the top of the income distribution because of the fear of downward mobility.
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Previous empirical work that examined how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future mobility prospects was based on the assumption that individuals have expectations of upward and downward mobility that are objectively correct, i.e., rational. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) assumed that all individuals use the average yearly transition matrix between income deciles for the United States to forecast their own future mobility prospects. This asserts that (i) all persons condition their mobility prospects on the same information, (ii) all persons have knowledge of the information on which they condition their expectations, and (iii) all persons process this information in the same way. The credibility of the rational expectations assumption, together with the common knowledge assumption that underlies the rationality of individual expectations, has recently been questioned sharply by Manski (2004) . Manski (2004) proposed to use instead self-reports of expectations elicited in the form of subjective probabilities, arguing that the use of probabilistic expectations data allows researchers to relax the assumption that individuals have rational expectations. This paper takes up this argument and uses newly available probabilistic expectations data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to test the relationship between self-reported expectations about occupational mobility and individual preferences for redistribution. Probabilistic expectations of significant career events serve as proxies for expectations of occupational upward and downward mobility. Rather than assuming that individuals have expectations that are objectively correct, we will only assume that the elicited expectations accurately describe individuals' perceptions of their occupational prospects. Our estimates suggest that subjective expectations of occupational upward and downward mobility are important predictors for individual preferences for redistribution.
Data
Our data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative longitudinal survey of private households in Germany. We restrict our sample to males aged 18-65 in 2005, who are part-time or full-time employed at the time of the interview. Since this study examines how preferences for redistribution depend on subjective expectations of significant career events ("pay increase" or "demotion"), we exclude self-employed individuals and civil servants from the analysis.
Preferences for Redistribution.
In 2005, the SOEP contained indicators of individual attitudes to redistribution. In particular, it included two questions regarding the support given by individuals to the marginal tax rates paid by the "poor" and the "rich". The first question was: "In Germany, everyone has to pay taxes in relation to his or her income. Those who earn more have to pay higher taxes (also known as "progressive taxes"). What do you think: Is the amount of taxes paid by an unskilled worker in Germany too much compared to other groups, too little, or exactly appropriate?". The second question read: "And what do you think about the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he or she pay too much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount in taxes compared to other groups?". While the "tax the poor?" question (TPQ) and the "tax the rich?" question (TRQ) do not directly ask about the support given to any specific redistributive tax policy, it is reasonable to assume that respondents hold expectations about the effect for them personally of a lower marginal tax rate for the poor and a higher marginal tax rate for the rich. In particular, we assume that a respondent who considers himself poor (respectively, rich) expects a financial gain (respectively, financial loss) from lowering the tax paid by an unskilled worker and/or raising the tax paid by a manager.
Explanatory Variables.
The expectations data to be used in this study are the responses of the SOEP panel members to a question posed in the survey year 2005 . In that year all individuals who were employed at the time of the interview were asked about their career expectations within the next two years. The precise question was: "How likely is it that the following career changes will take place within the next two years? Please estimate the probability of such a change according to a scale from 0 to 100. 0 means that such a change will definitely not take place. 100 means that such a change definitely will take place. All the values in between can be used for differentiation." Respondents were asked about the probability that they "personally receive a pay raise above the rate negotiated by the union or for the staff in general" and the probability that they "are demoted at their current place of employment".
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We interpret answers to the former question as capturing subjective expectations of occupational upward mobility, while answers to the latter are interpreted as capturing subjective expectations of occupational downward mobility. Respondents report their expectations using the full 0-100 percent chance scale, rounding to the nearest 10 percent (i.e., 0, 10, . . . , 90, 100). The self-reported expectations about occupational mobility will be represented by four dummy variables defined as:
E p=0 = 1 if probability of pay raise or demotion is p ∈ {0} E 10≤p≤30 = 1 if probability of pay raise or demotion is p ∈ {10, 20, 30} E 40≤p≤60 = 1 if probability of pay raise or demotion is p ∈ {40, 50, 60} E p≥70 = 1 if probability of pay raise or demotion is p ∈ {70, 80, 90, 100}. Table 1 provides cross-tabulations of occupational expectations with our measures of redistributive preferences. The table clearly indicates a link between occupational expectations and attitudes towards redistribution: the higher the perceived chance of a pay raise, the less common the view that the tax paid by the poor (respectively, the rich) is too high (respectively, too low). Conversely, the higher the perceived chance of a demotion, the more frequent the belief that the tax paid by the poor (respectively, the rich) is too high (respectively, too low).
To examine whether the same evidence also emerges from multivariate regression analysis, we consider the following explanatory variables as potential determinants of people's preferences concerning redistribution: household income; education; willingness to take risks (Bénabou and Ok, 2001 ); beliefs about the roles of self-reliance versus luck (Fong, 2001 ; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006); sense of reciprocity (Fong, 2001 ); dummy variables for being from the Guestworker and East German sample; age; and age squared. Some of our specifications also include household size controls and federal state dummies. 
Results
We now present ordered probit estimates for a model of individual attitudes to redistribution. The regression equation is:
where R * i is a latent variable, R i is the observed variable (answers to TPQ and TRQ), E i is the vector of expectation dummies, and X i is the vector of explanatory variables discussed above. The observed variable R i takes values 1 ("tax too low"), 2 ("tax appropriate"), and 3 ("tax too high") for both TPQ and TRQ.
To begin with, let us focus on the relationship between expectations of occupational upward mobility and preferences for redistribution (Table 2 ). Our strategy consists of analyzing three different specifications of the above model. In all specifi- * * * , * * , * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. Household size controls are the number of children in the household and the number of adults in the household. Regressions also control for age-squared. Number of observations in all specifications is 2,848.
cations perceived occupational mobility emerges as a significant predictor for individual attitudes towards redistribution, provided the probabilistic upward expectation is sufficiently high. Indeed, respondents who express a very high degree of certainty regarding their upward prospects (E p≥70 ) are significantly less likely (respectively, more likely) to say that the tax paid by the poor (respectively, the tax paid by the rich) is too high, while no such effect emerges amongst those who have less optimistic career expectations. Among the other explanatory variables only a few have significant explanatory power. The rich and well educated are less likely to support lower taxes for the poor and are more likely to advocate a disburdening of the rich. People who are prepared to take risks are significantly more averse towards disproportionately taxing upper incomes (Bénabou and Ok, 2001 ). Individuals who think that "how their life goes depends on themselves" are significantly less likely to support lower taxes for the poor, while the opposite is true for those who belief that achievement is determined by luck (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . East Germans are more in favor of redistribution than West Germans, which could reflect some ideological worldview inherited from Communism, or some overall desire for interregional (West-to-East) redistribution. Finally, being a guestworker increases the demand for redistribution, which could reflect a POUM related mechanism imperfectly measured by the other regressors.
We turn next to the associations between perceived downward mobility and redistributive preferences (Table 3) . Almost all of the action is amongst individuals who perceive the chance of being demoted to be very high (E p≥70 ): a large perceived risk of occupational downward mobility promotes a desire for lowering the marginal tax paid by the poor and an even larger desire for raising the marginal tax paid by the rich. The estimated coefficients are precisely estimated and are statistically significant at either the 1 or 5 percent level. These results suggest that a sufficiently large subjective probability of occupational downward mobility significantly increases a person's support for redistribution. What is more, the effects of perceived downward mobility in Table 3 are roughly twice as large in absolute value than the effects of perceived upward mobility in Table 2 . In other words, the fear of downward mobility is more closely associated with redistributive preferences than the prospect of upward mobility. Among the control variables, household income, education, risk willingness, self-reliance, and luck emerge again as significant predictors.
Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to examine how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future occupational prospects, using probabilistic expectations data from the SOEP. Our results considerably strengthen existing evidence on the validity of the "prospect of upward mobility" hypothesis: a sufficiently large chance of occupational upward mobility decreases the demand for redistribution; conversely, a sufficiently large risk of occupational downward mobility promotes a desire for more redistribution.
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